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INTRODUCTION 
THE overseas territories of the Kingdom of the Netherlands consist 
of the West and the Netherlands Indies. 
The West Indies contain some Lesser Antilles—viz., three Lee-
ward Islands : St. Maarten, the northern part of which, St. Martin, 
is French, St. Eustatius and Saba; and the Windward Islands, 
Curaçao, Aruba and Bonaire, these islands all being ruled by a 
Governor. Moreover, Suriname, situated on the South American 
Continent between French Guiana (Cayenne), British Guiana and 
Brazil, is also governed by a Governor. 
The Netherlands Indies are an archipelago,- forming the south-
west boundary line of the Pacific, situated between Further India 
and Australia and governed by the Governor-General. 
This Governor-General and these Governors rule in the name 
of and as delegates of the Queen of the Netherlands. The extent 
and the importance of these territories are very divergent, as the 
Antilles, mentioned above, cover some 1,200 square kilometres 
and between them have a population of 87,000 souls. Suriname 
covers an area of 173,840 square kilometres with a population 
of only 147,000 souls. The Netherlands Indies, on the other hand, 
cover 1,900,000 square kilometres with a population of more than 
60,700,000 souls. 
THE WEST INDIES 
I. HISTORICAL SKETCH 
Historically for the Mother-Country the West Indies were of 
great importance before, and the East Indies, on the contrary, far 
more after the nineteenth century. The obstructions Philip II. 
had put in the way of the Dutch carrying trade, the fall of 
Antwerp and in consequence the removal of much capital to 
Holland (soon Amsterdam was to become the first port of Europe) 
—capital that for the greater part was invested in the carrying 
trade, led to the extension of the shipping trade in those tropical 
regions where the Spaniards and Portuguese obtained their pro-
ducts, which were so much needed in Western Europe. 
So the salt-deposits discovered in the Leeward Islands in the West 
Indies led to a lively shipping trade from Holland, which at the 
same time was made lucrative by a very profitable smuggling 
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trade in connection with the Spanish and Portuguese possessions 
in America. In 1621 the first West Indies Company was granted 
a patent; and since its principal object was, firstly, to inflict injury 
on the enemy, later, to expel the Portuguese from Brazil—which 
was a success only to a small degree—and lastly, to conquer land, 
this again made it necessary to import cheap labour—viz., slaves— 
and for this object the Gold Coast was conquered in 1637. 
From Spain the West Indies Company conquered Curaçao, 
Aruba and Bonaire, all favourably situated for the smuggling trade 
on the Spanish colonies on the opposite coast (1634). About 1631 
the Dutch settled in St. Eustatius, Saba, and St. Maarten, further 
in St. Thomas, St. Jan and St. Croix, which three islands were 
evacuated some years after and then were occupied by the Danes. 
The French occupied the northern part of St. Maarten in 1640. 
After Nieuw Nederland—a colonists' settlement on the Hudson 
River in North America—had been given up, the profits for the 
West Indies Company stopped, and in the end payments were 
suspended. 
Through the intermediary of the States-General a second West 
Indies Company was founded, which took over the possessions of 
the former Company for 30 per cent. 
Whereas the first West Indies Company for the greater part 
was a carrying trade company for smuggling and privateering, its 
successor was able to work some commercial stations and man-
aged to run some tropical plantations. 
This second West Indies Company subsisted on the recognition 
payments of the shipping trade and again of the smuggling trade 
in the Spanish colonies in America, especially of the trade in 
slaves, for which Curaçao was indeed the centre. 
For smuggling to North America, St. Eustatius was the proper 
island, from where arms and munitions were delivered during 
the American insurrection in 1774. In 1781 it was conquered by 
the English and ransacked. 
In consequence trade was transferred to other islands—viz., 
to Danish St. Thomas and Swedish St. Bartholomeus. 
When the Fourth English War (1784) was over the West Indies 
Company had continually to struggle with deficits with a burden 
of debts of f.4 millions. In 1791 the States took over the West 
Indies Company. 
Suriname, where the English sugar planters had their planta-
tions on the Suriname River and the Commewijne, was conquered 
in 1666 by the Dutch and in 1682 became a possession of the West 
Indies Company, afterwards of " the Society of Suriname," in 
which the West Indies Company could exercise an option for 
one-third. Dutch shippers were granted trade on Suriname 
at recognition. Colonization was encouraged. The West Indies 
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Company, however, retained the monopoly of the importation of 
slaves. 
The number of plantations increased from 50 to 200 (1688)— 
sugar and indigo—and to 400 in 1733. The number of slaves 
amounted to 12,000 in 1712 and as many as 25,000 in 1749. Many 
of them fled into the interior and from there repeatedly invaded 
the cultivated area. Only in 1775 did the troops succeed in check-
ing those raids. 
In the meantime, besides sugar and coffee plantations, cocoa 
and cotton plantations prospered in Suriname, especially between 
1750 and 1770. The value of the goods imported into Holland 
from Suriname was estimated at f.8 millions in 1785. But the 
colonists wanted many slaves, which forced them to take up 
money on mortgages with Amsterdam moneylenders, which 
gradually made them the latter's tenants. 
In 1791 Suriname passed into the hands of the States. Then 
there were there 3,000 whites, half of them Jews, and 53,000 
slaves. 
During the Napoleonic wars all those colonies came into the 
possession of the English. Not before the Convention of 1814 
were Suriname and the six islands—Curaçao, Bonaire, Aruba, St. 
Eustatius, St. Maarten and Saba—returned to us; in 1816 the 
transfer took place. 
In the British colonies, as also in our above-mentioned colonies, 
slavery was prohibited in 1808. In 1833lt w a s abolished by England 
in all her colonies. France followed in 1840, Denmark later on. 
In the West Indies slavery was abolished in 1863, which procured 
f.12 millions as an indemnification for the former proprietors. In 
Suriname and in the islands 33,621 and 11,654 s^aves respectively 
were liberated. They were in a hurry to leave the plantations, a 
blow from which Suriname, which as a plantation colony before 
all needed cheap labour, has never recovered. The fact that owing 
to the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 the colonial products 
from Java, with" its prosperous agriculture and numerous and 
cheap native labour, after 1870 appeared in ever-increasing 
quantities in the European market, was also decisive for West 
Indian trade. 
After the fall of the Spanish authority in America and the new-
born States there had opened their ports to trade, Curaçao also 
lost its importance as a centre for smuggling, which then had be-
come useless. Thus Suriname as well as Curaçao has been a great 
disappointment for the Mother-Country since 1816. 
After slavery had been abolished in 1863 Suriname had to solve 
the problem of the immigration of labour. A treaty concluded 
with England in 1870 allowed us to enlist and ship British Indian 
coolies. Also Javanese coolies were imported, especially after 1893. 
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Between 1873 and 1913, 32,000 British Indians and 11,000 
Javanese respectively were imported. But agriculture was not a 
success, paid labour weighed heavy upon the plantations. More-
over, there was much competition from abroad and disease in 
the plants. 
The number of sugar plantations, which in 1833 amounted to 
105, was reduced to five in 1914, though with a much wider area 
than before. The export of coffee (arabica) amounted to 15 million 
pounds in 1790, to five millions in 1816, whereas it quite stopped 
later on. Since 1881 Liberia coffee has taken its place with 
a very unstable market—in 1935 an exportation of over 8 | 
million pounds, but afterwards again there was a great decline. 
Many sugar plantations were transformed into cocoa plantations 
in the middle of the nineteenth century, which between them ex-
ported 500,000 kilogrammes in 1870, in 1895 as much as 4 ! 
million kilogrammes, but after the krulote disease broke out there 
was a turn for the worse and exportation decreased again. 
v
 Cotton realized an export of 1,165,000 kilogrammes in 1825, 
309,000 kilogrammes in i860, but since 1885 cotton has no longer 
been exported. The cultivation of bananas, started in 1906, was 
also stopped in 1913, on account of the disease that broke out in 
1909; of late years, however, efforts have been made to revive 
this cultivation. Important recent cultivations are those of citrus 
and rice especially, which is now the principal Suriname agricul-
tural product. 
II. PRESENT CONDITIONS 
At present there is in Suriname a population of 148,971, apart 
from the 17,000 forest negroes and 3,500 Indians. Of these, 
35'5 P e r cent, live in the capital, Paramaribo. The population in-
cludes 41,353 British Indians, 33,776 Javanese, 1,962 Europeans, 
977 of whom were born in the Netherlands. 
Suriname receives a subsidy of some f.3 millions annually from 
the Mother-Country in order to balance the budget (assets over 
1936, f.3'9 millions, liabilities f.67 millions). 
The American Bauxite Company at Moengo exported 234,845 
tons of bauxite in 1936. 
The production of gold amounted to 443,487 grammes, of 
balata to 121,044 kilogrammes, of coffee to 3,321 tons, to the 
value of f.687,000, of rice to 34,154 tons, of oranges, 6,622 cases 
were shipped, sugar export amounted to 16,115 t o n s» t 0 the 
value of f.427,000—everything together in no way sufficient to 
raise Suriname from this condition of distress. 
For this reason Suriname suffers today from financial im-
potence. The Mother-Country helped Suriname with f .80 millions 
from 1867 to 1936, but without any result. Financially matters 
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remained the same and a solution for the better has not yet been 
found. 
The opening of the Panama Canal in 1914 gave new prospects 
to Curaçao. The capital, Willemstad, has an ideal harbour for 
ocean traffic. Another advantageous feature is the fact that the 
Batavian Oil Company and the Standard have made Curaçao and 
Aruba into important places for their raw oils from Venezuela, 
which are there worked up for further distribution. 
Thus the economic condition of Curaçao is rapidly improving, 
and soon the subsidy from the Mother-Country can be dispensed 
with; 4,579 steamers, with a capacity of 24 million metric tons, 
called at the harbour at Willemstad in 1928, and 5,241 steamers 
with a capacity of 31 million metric tons in 1936. 
Aruba harbour is nearly as large as that of Willemstad. In 
1936, 82 million tons of raw oil were imported into Curaçao and 
105 into Aruba. 
In 1936 the total value of the imports from abroad amounted to 
f.197 millions, f.179 millions of which represented oils; of the 
rest, the share from Holland came to f.5-2 millions. Exports to 
foreign countries amounted to f.201 millions, f.23 millions of 
which went to Holland. 
Since 1932 the revenues, as compared with the expenses, of 
the colonies have shown a credit balance respectively of f.604,000, 
f.495,000, f.869,000, f.1,253,000 and f.1,389,000 (in 1936). 
Liabilities to Holland through cash loans, totalling from 1928 
to 1931 7-1 million guilders, were redeemed in full. The account 
with Holland showed a credit balance of f. 1,202,000 for Curaçao 
towards the end of 1936. 
THE NETHERLANDS INDIES 
I. HISTORIC EXPOSITION 
The policy of Spain, which had compelled the Dutch to extend 
their profitable shipping trade to the Levant, the West Indies, 
etc., induced them, following in the path of the Portuguese, to try 
and find for themselves a way to the Far East, to the Indies (the 
Moluccas), the rich, marvellous spice islands. To prevent 
mutually unfavourable commercial competition the East India 
Company was founded in 1602—in which the statesman Van 
Oldenbarneveldt took the initiative. 
In accordance with the mercantile standards of those early days 
the Portuguese, who a century ago had already gained authority 
in the Indies, carried on a policy of monopoly there, rigorously 
excluding all foreign traders and keeping the internal trade in 
their own hands. 
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The East India Company, succeeding the Portuguese, did not 
lose time in carrying on the same policy of isolation. 
Indeed, in those early days it was considered the usual thing for 
a country to get from the colonies anything that might be of use 
or yield some profit to the Homeland, and in any case to further 
her trade. Thus the East India Company strictly adhered to its 
monopoly, which realized great profits, according to the ideas of 
those days, the policy being : " The colonies exist only for the 
profit of the Mother-Country." 
The system and organization of the East India Company 
formed the pattern for most privileged commercial companies 
founded in other countries in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries. 
In the course of time great loans were granted to the East India 
Company by the Amsterdam Bank, founded in 1608, residing at 
the Amsterdam Town Hall; its principal object was to take the 
place of the private moneylenders^ whose actions were considered 
obnoxious. 
This bank, which in the latter part of the seventeenth, and 
almost during the whole of the eighteenth century had a cash 
balance of more than twenty million guilders, played an important 
part in the world trade of those days. In fact, in the seventeenth 
century Amsterdam was the money market of the world and re-
mained so during the greater part of the eighteenth century. In 
those days there was a close relationship between this money 
market, overseas trade and the companies with shares, one of 
which was the East India Company. 
WHAT WAS THE INFLUENCE OF THE EAST INDIA 
COMPANY UPON HOLLAND? 
The staple of the Indian products was transferred from Lisbon 
to Amsterdam, and so great support was given to the commercial 
position of the Netherlands. Not only the carrying trade, but also 
the staple trade was a national branch of business. For the rest, 
the fight the East India Company, on their own account, carried 
on with the national enemy was a great help to the Republic. 
A tax was raised on the shares and bonds of the Company, which 
from 1680 to 1698 annually brought four hundred thousand 
guilders into the Dutch treasury. 
The Company procured employment for a part of the Dutch 
nation. From 1640 to 1649, 3,650 hands were annually taken on, 
and this increased to more than 8,000 after 1750, among whom, 
however, there was an increasing number of foreigners. In the 
eighteenth century the number of sailors in the service of the 
Company was 4,000 on an average, half of them being Dutch. 
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From 1602 to 1622 the Company paid a dividend of 200 per cent.— 
viz., 10 per cent, per year. The last year in which a dividend was 
paid was in 1782. During the whole period of its existence the 
Company paid out 18 per cent, on an average. Through the Com-
pany the national wealth increased considerably. Between 1602 
and 1782 its capital was paid out 36 times. In addition there were 
the remittances of the civil officers, the fortunes taken home and 
the legacies bequeathed. In the latter part of the seventeenth 
century f.800,000 on an average were annually remitted per man-
date, and from 1770 to 1780 f.4 millions annually. The grand 
total may perhaps be estimated at f.370 millions. 
During the first 100 years of the two-centuries-long govern-
ment of the Company in the Indies, it was first and foremost a 
profitable trading concern. Gradually, however, the East India 
Company was forced to intervene in the quarrels of the native 
princes and tribes, however much they disliked doing so, and in 
this way they attained great territorial authority. From a trading 
concern the Company became a State. But in consequence they 
incurred the onerous obligation of maintaining an army and 
a navy, the cost of which constantly increased. 
It has been rightly said of the East India Company that " it had 
no history." Often contrary to the advice of their best Governors-
General, the directors in Holland always adhered to their system 
of getting as much profit as possible for the Mother-Country and 
adhered to their monopoly even in face of the increasing rivalry 
of the French and English navigators and traders. Together with 
bad dividend policy, faulty bookkeeping and the insufficient pay 
of the officials, with consequent corruption, were prominent 
causes of the Company's fall at the end of the eighteenth century, 
when the waves of the French revolution began to spread and 
finally washed away the East India Company. The colonies then 
became the property of the Government. 
In 1794 the liabilities of the Company amounted to f.85 millions, 
in 1792 to f.112 millions and in 1796 to 1.120 millions. The in-
heritance of the Company, burdened with debts, passed into the 
hands of the Bataafsche Republiek, which also had to struggle 
with great financial difficulties. More liberal ways than the Com-
pany had followed were first suggested by Dirk van Hogendorp 
(1799), whose ideas were far ahead of his times. 
In 1807, King Louis Napoleon sent " iron-fisted " Daendels to 
Java to defend it against the English, and Daendels in some way 
prepared the way for Raffles, who came to Java in 1811 to estab-
lish English authority there, but then broke with the past and 
began to reform the government in a more liberal way. 
After the fall of Napoleon the Netherlands recovered their in-
dependence, but the Great Powers of Europe required a strong 
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State that would be prepared to check the French on their 
northern frontier, and so Belgium and Holland were united and 
our colonies were returned to us. Thus the young Kingdom of 
the Netherlands again became a "Colonial Empire." 
The new system started by Raffles was maintained by the 
" Commissarissen-Generaal " (delegates), whom King William I. 
sent to the Indies to take over the colonies from the English. The 
repression of corruption was continued, the administration of 
justice improved, the system of " land rent " of Raffles took the 
place of compulsory cultivation and the contingent system of the 
United East India Company and gave back to the native farmer 
the right to dispose of the fruit of his labour. Trade became free 
and European private enterprise was allowed to participate in 
non-native agriculture. Liberalism, as contrasted with the system 
of the East India Company, revealed the importance of well-
regulated internal administration as a means of giving prosperity 
to the population. The system was not to last long. What the 
Government had omitted to consider was the fact that the simple 
native farmers were unable to help themselves without guidance 
and instruction. 
When the pressure under which they had worked so long was 
taken away it was found that the new policy was of no use to 
them. The Government in Holland had expected that agriculture 
Would flourish and that increase of the products wanted for 
the European market would favourably influence trade and 
navigation with the Mother-Country, so that the colonies, instead 
of being an encumbrance, would become a source of prosperity 
and wealth to her. But the new system became a great dis-
appointment in this respect. 
The Commissaris-Generaal Du Bus, who wanted to attract 
Western capital and Western agriculture to the Indies, in his well-
known report of 1827 put forward suggestions which would pre-
pare the Indian State for fruitful European enterprise, but that 
only " very slowly." The condition of colonial as well as home 
finances, however, was very bad, so that a " quick action " remedy 
was required. For this reason only King William I. accepted the 
compulsory " cultivation system " developed by the Governor-
General Van den Bosch, which provided a remedy almost at once. 
Theoretically it looked very fine, but in fact the native farmer 
was not left any freedom; he was compelled to cultivate those 
products that the State wanted in order to improve the desperate 
finances of the Motherland and colonies. 
In the result there were no more deficits in the Indian house-
hold. On the contrary there was much profit to the Mother-
Country. In 1833 the credit balance amounted to f.3 millions, 
in 1834 to f.10 millions, and about 1845 the proceeds were the 
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highest and amounted to f.13 millions. This system lasted some 
50 years longer and realized about f.900 millions in that period. 
In those years the Nederlandsche Handelsmaatschappij, founded 
by King William I., was of great importance. Originally its object 
was to revive the languishing trade, navigation and industry in 
the Motherland. 
At the beginning the results were somewhat disappointing, but 
the Van den Bosch system promised great profits to the Neder-
landsche Handelsmaatschappij. 
This concern received in consignment for sale the products of 
which the Government could dispose, thanks to this cultivation 
system, and which consequently did not appear in the Indian 
markets any longer. 
Dutch boats chartered by the Maatschappij took the goods to 
Amsterdam, and thus this port was again made the staple place 
of colonial products, and national shipbuilding and navigation 
revived. 
In the Indies the position of the British trader, however, was 
much more favourable than that of the Dutch trader, because the 
British merchant also imported English textiles, whereas his 
Dutch competitor did not dispose of similar imports. William I. 
now wanted to make all possible efforts to start a Dutch cotton 
industry for which the Indies were to be the market. At the 
so-called secret " linen contracts " the Nederlandsche Handels-
maatschappij undertook to spend yearly a certain sum on the 
purchase of textile products. The duties paid on diem in the 
Indies were returned to the Maatschappij and our cotton industry 
was put on its feet. 
But from the increasing quantities of exports, produced under 
the cultivation system, free trade did not reap any profits, but 
only the Handelsmaatschappij, which to a certain degree was 
looked upon as a revived East India Company. 
It was not so much the system itself, as its faulty application, 
which proved very oppressive for the population. But the strait-
ened finances of the Motherland needed the proceeds to be forced 
up and gradually the home finances, which had lacked support, 
began to depend on the Indian market. 
But this system, that became more and more oppressive to the 
population, deteriorated into a continuation of the contingent sys-
tem of the East India Company, and in the end there was a primi-
tive form of monopolized State exploitation, the risks for which 
were for the greater part shifted on to the native farmer himself. 
The Dutch people were at first slow to notice the deterioration 
of the cultivation system, but the new liberal ideas, still weak at the 
beginning of the nineteenth century, gradually became stronger. 
Since about the middle of the nineteenth century a revolutionary 
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reaction had again come over Europe, the Netherlands Parlia-
ment had also secured greater authority and influence in Indian 
affairs, authoritative eye-witnesses and liberal speakers were heard, 
and consequently the system of Van den Bosch was abrogated. 
Whereas the less important compulsory cultivations — often 
yielding no profit at all—had already been abrogated previously, 
in 1870 the compulsory cultivation of sugar was also stopped. 
Only the profitable coffee cultivation was continued, but without 
its many abuses. The proceeds of this last compulsory State 
enterprise, however, gradually diminished the. credit balances, and 
remittances to the Motherland grew less and less and then stopped 
altogether when the Atjeh War broke out in 1873, which was to 
last twenty years, and cost tremendous sums of money. 
II. EVOLUTION TO THE PRESENT POSITION 
The abrogation of the compulsory cultivation system in Java 
was a decisive turning-point in our colonial policy, and the more 
humane policy of liberalism for the colonies was definitely estab-
lished. Henceforth the natives were allowed to dispose of their 
toil and the fruits of their labour. The new agrarian legislation 
of 1870 scrupulously guarded against dispossession of the land 
rights of native farmers. Moreover, it created the possibility— 
the importance of which for economic expansion or the Indies 
had already become evident—of reclaiming waste lands on a large 
scale for non-State agricultural enterprise. 
Before the abolition of State agriculture by forced labour the 
Exchequer had been dependent on the compulsory cultivations, 
but now this financial basis had to be changed. Henceforth 
the Exchequer depended on the European agricultural concerns 
founded there, as primitive native farming would not be of any 
avail in this respect. Western enterprise for agriculture was very 
much furthered by the policy of " open door " and "free trade." 
" Free trade " and " open door " were the policies pursued from 
that time onwards, and thus the way was prepared for the Euro-
pean industrialist to grow tropical produce for international com-
merce. The economic expansion, owing to this quite new policy, 
was accompanied by a considerable investment, first especially of 
Dutch capital in agricultural estates in Java, afterwards also of 
foreign capital especially on the Outer Islands. It was utilized 
to found large plantations for mountain cultivations for the pro-
duction of coffee, tea, Peru bark, etc. In the valleys of Java sugar 
estates and tobacco plantations were started on the grounds rented 
for this purpose from the natives, everything being done with 
native labour and deliveries by a free contract. 
As to the Outer possessions, the costly Atjeh war dragged on for 
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twenty years, and was only ended by complete subjection through 
the vigorous intervention of the military commander of that time, 
the General Van Heutsz. This success led to Dutch authority 
being recognized de facto everywhere on the Outer Islands, and 
thus an era of peace and safety was inaugurated, creating the 
possibility of further economic development. The demand all 
over the world for rubber, which began in the first years of this 
century, led to the investment of much foreign capital, besides 
Dutch money, in order to cultivate waste lands, especially in the 
Outer Islands, previously reclaimed, and grow rubber, later also 
tea, coffee in the newly founded plantations, and enterprises in 
oil-palm, filament, etc. 
Thus it came about that in 1929 about \\ milliard guilders were 
invested, more than 1 milliard of which was Dutch capital. If 
we add to this the sums invested in oil and other mining in-
dustries, in shipping and railways, banking, etc., the total invest-
ment of capital in the Indies before the crisis may be estimated at 
about 4 milliard guilders, one-third of which was non-Dutch. 
Undoubtedly the open door policy, the plantations on the Outer 
Islands, the economic expansion of the Pacific countries and the 
late world demand especially for rubber, led the way to this un-
precedented investment of capital, which became the powerful 
lever which, in the last years before the crisis, raised the Nether-
lands Indies from a purely national domain into an international 
centre of tropical produce for the world market. For towards 
the end of 1929 the investment in Java estates was f.1,332 millions, 
f.1,118 millions of which were Dutch, f.142 millions British, f.36 
millions Franco-Belgian, and £.5-9 millions Japanese capital. For 
Sumatra Eastern Coastlands, f.642 millions, f.360 millions of 
which were Dutch, f.124 millions British, f.53 millions American, 
f.72 millions Franco-Belgian, and f.137 millions Japanese capital. 
For Sumatra Southern Coastlands f.90 millions, f.57 millions of 
which were Dutch, f.n millions British, f.32 millions Franco-
Belgian. 
In Java, the principal investments were made in sugar, f.793 
millions, f.779 millions of which were Dutch; further in rubber 
f.270 millions, in coffee f.105 millions, tea f.143 millions, and Peru 
bark f.20 millions. 
For Sumatra Eastern Coastlands, rubber f.351 millions (f.129 
millions of which were Dutch), tobacco f.120 millions, oil-palm 
f.83 millions, tea f.41 millions, filament f.40 millions. 
For South Sumatra Coastlands, rubber f.39 millions, coffee 
f.25 millions, tea f.14 millions, Peru-bark f.5 millions, and oil-
palm f.5 millions. 
In 1929 the exports from the Netherlands Indies amounted to 
f. 1,443 m""hons. 
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In 1929 the East Indies' share in world exports was in the case 
of agave 22 per cent., Peru bark 94 per cent., coffee 6 per cent., 
copra 29 per cent., kapok 75 per cent., oil-palm 14 per cent., 
pepper 69 per cent., rubber 30 per cent., sugar 10 per cent., and 
tea 17 per cent. 
In 1929 the imports to the Netherlands Indies amounted to 
f. 1,088 millions. Of this total f.519 millions came from Europe 
(f.213 millions of which were from the Netherlands), f.139 millions 
from America, f.395 millions from Asia (f.114 millions of which 
were from Japan). 
There arose in consequence an enormous trade between the 
Indies and the Netherlands, and in a lesser degree with several 
other countries, specially those on the Pacific, thanks to our policy 
of " free trade " and " open door." 
In the Indies the seaports began to prosper, as also navigation, 
money markets, banking; and directly and indirecdy the influ-
ence of this general prosperity was felt in the Netherlands Indies 
and in Holland as well as abroad. 
The number of Dutchmen who went to the Indies increased 
rapidly at that time; 40,000 Dutchmen at least were occupied in 
the Indies and gained their livelihood there. Of the total exports 
from Holland, the proceeds of which in 1927 amounted to 
f.1,900 millions, 7 per cent, went to the Indies. Thanks to the 
Indies some 150,000 people—viz., one-tenth of all the Dutch 
workers—found regular employment in the Netherlands. 
But in 1929 the present world crisis began. In the Indies it 
made itself felt by a tremendous fall in the prices, for the time . 
being more in export than in import prices. This deteriora-
tion in price levels made stringent economy a necessity, and con-
sequently there has been reduction in wages and unemployment. 
Besides, there has been the serious fact that the exports, during and 
after the World War more and more directed to the Pacific coun-
tries, did not find a regular market there any longer, owing to 
agitation and decreased purchasing power there. So exportation 
to European markets began to take place. There followed an 
export trade in the opposite direction—from east to west. The 
imports into the Netherlands Indies began to come more and 
more from Asia, for the greater part very cheap goods from Japan, 
instead of from Europe. Thus there came about an import trade 
from west to east. The system of barter has been revived, and 
barter and reciprocity are the order of the day. 
So in 1928 256 per cent, of the textile imports came from the 
Netherlands, 27-1 per cent, from England, 30-8 per cent, from 
Japan. But in 1934 those figures were respectively 7-2 per cent., 
28 per cent., and 83-1 per cent. ! 
Owing to the world crisis the proceeds of the total imports 
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amounted only to f.272 millions in 1935, f.99 millions of which 
came from Europe (of which f.99 millions, f.36 millions again 
came from Holland), and f.140 millions from Asia (f.81 millions 
of which came from Japan)—viz., f.69 millions for victuals and 
luxuries, f.24 millions for chemical products, f.81 millions for 
yarns and dry goods, f.25 millions for metals, f.11 millions for 
vehicles, and f.23 millions for engines. 
In 1935 the proceeds of the total exports amounted to f.446 
millions; f.70 millions of which were for rubber, f.26 millions for 
spices, f.18 millions for coffee, f.45 millions for seeds and fruit con-
taining oil, f.36 millions for sugar, f.29 millions for tobacco, f.36 
millions for tea, f.14 millions for filaments, f.87 millions for 
petroleum, and f.38 millions for cement and minerals. 
It stands to reason that the world crisis strongly influenced the 
Budget of the State, as the Exchequer for the greater part depends 
on the cultivation of some products for exportation and on mining 
products. In 1928 the State's revenues (on the common service) 
of the Indies amounted to f.551 millions and the expenses to f.510 
millions, with a credit balance of f.41 millions on the common 
service. 
In 1929 this credit balance amounted to only f.8 millions. In 
1930 the deficits began—viz., f.85 millions, then f.102 millions, 
f.141 millions, f.121 millions, and in 1934 f.82 millions. 
In 1928 the Netherlands Indies national debt amounted to 
f.1,000 millions. 
Owing to circumstances over which there was no control it 
became impossible for the Netherlands Indies any longer to main-
tain the policy of " free trade " and " open door," which had 
been adhered to since 1870. 
At present, through international co-operation we have arrived 
at the restriction of tea, Peru bark, rubber, sugar, and tin. 
To prevent the interior market from getting dislocated, the 
import of foreign rice, kedele, cement, etc., was prohibited 
altogether or controlled in every detail. 
A general emergency import ordinance created the possibility 
of quotas and licenses, which have been applied for many pro-
ducts. So Dutch industry has a considerable share in the Nether-
lands Indies imports and could employ many thousands of 
labourers in our country. 
In fact, the Netherlands have shares in some eleven Nether-
lands Indies quotas to a total amount of f.17 millions; the one 
in textile industry is of great importance. In that branch of in-
dustry labour was assured for 7,000 hands in Holland. At present 
a considerable part of the Dutch cotton industry is supported by 
the Netherlands Indies quota. 
A general emergency adjustment has also been made for the 
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exports, so that objects for exchange with mother-countries have 
been created according to the policy " Do ut des" 
Thus economically and financially a series of measures have 
been taken, with the concurrence of the Motherland, which for 
the time being deviate from the liberal policy of " free trade " 
and " open door." This is done only from a defensive point of 
view, but with the strong intention to return, as soon as circum-
stances will allow, to the former liberal policy so necessary for the 
welfare of the Netherlands Indies, an export state far excellence. 
There have been several signs pointing to an economic revival. 
Since 1936 a more prosperous future may be looked forward to, 
though again there may be trouble in the exportation to the 
markets in the agitated Far East, also extra expenditure may be 
necessary for defence because of the conditions in the Pacific. 
Symptoms of all this may be stated in the Netherlands Indies 
Budget. 
In 1935 there was a deficit of f-33'5 millions on the common 
service, in 1936 of f.21-5 millions, in 1937 a balance of f.8-8 millions. 
For 1938 the expenses.of the common service are estimated at 
f.377 millions and revenues at f.372 millions, the extra expenses 
at respectively f.83 millions and extra revenues at f.50 millions; so 
a total deficit of f.38 millions, f.33 millions of which are for extra 
expenses, especially defence. 
In 1935 the Netherlands Indies national debt had risen to f.1,500 
millions, with an obligatory payment of rent of f.59 millions, 
and redeeming f.22 millions, which is a heavy burden on the 
Budget. At the end of 1937 t n c Netherlands Indies national debt 
amounted to £.1,367 millions. 
Even a short time ago the Netherlands Indies could defray all 
the expenses of government as well as of the army; for the navy 
the Motherland has always defrayed part of the cost. During the 
crisis that item has been considerably increased. Of great im-
portance for economic revival has been the recent rise in the price 
of exports, because the economic depression did not so much in-
fluence the export weight as the value of those products. More-
over, the emergency measures taken by the Government have un-
doubtedly contributed towards the cost of the reconquest of the 
Netherlands Indies market by the West. This is also the case 
with the Netherlands, and at the same time a withdrawal by Japan 
has become noticeable. 
FUTURE PROSPECTS 
COLONIZATION 
First of all there is to be considered the question whether the 
Netherlands Indies, or perhaps Suriname, would not be the 
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appropriate outlet for colonization and provide a solution for the 
difficult and grave problem of Dutch unemployment. It seems 
natural enough that the thinly populated districts of the Outer 
Islands should be the appropriate territory for colonization from 
the Netherlands. But here the facts have proved that there are 
many difficulties. 
In Java, in spite of her over-population, there is still an increase 
of half a million per year. Attention has been repeatedly drawn 
to the benefit that would result from the emigration of Javanese 
and of the Eurasian population in Java to the Outer Islands. In 
Java only a very limited area is available for the extension of 
native agriculture, and within a short time this will be completely 
exhausted. The attempts at colonization of the natives with their 
simple standard of life have at last become more successful, but 
the Eurasians have another, a higher standard, and the results in 
regard to their colonization have not been very successful. The 
districts that would be appropriate for them are few; the Dai'ri 
Islands in Sumatra and especially New Guinea have been con-
sidered, but advertising for immigrants in that territory seems 
premature and not yet justified, as only little is as yet known of 
that large land, and that little is not promising, so that the 
Government has repeatedly issued warnings against expectations 
aroused by advertisements for colonization from the Nether-
lands. 
Far more exploration needs to be made before it can be ascer-
tained whether immigration and colonization are likely to succeed 
in New Guinea to any large extent. What is known about New 
Guinea at present is not very encouraging, but still there are 
many as yet unknown factors and circumstances that may turn 
out to be favourable in the future. 
WHAT OTHER PROSPECTS MAY THE FUTURE HOLD IN STORE? 
Owing to the depression the international free markets dis-
appeared for the greater part, also for the Netherlands. Many 
countries with which the Netherlands had entertained com-
mercial relations before tried to keep or redress their balance at 
home, excluding all foreign competition also with a view to pro-
curing employment for the ever-increasing number of idle 
hands. So, more than ever before, the oversea markets, also for 
Holland, have attained great importance as outlets for their agri-
cultural and industrial products; but for that reason low prices 
and continual adjustment to those markets will be necessary. 
For the time being the Netherlands Indies will remain an 
export country, especially for the surrounding Pacific countries, 
sending out agrarian and mining products (sugar, rubber, tea, 
coffee, filament, copra, Peru bark, tobacco, palm-oil, tin, and oil). 
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In this respect Dutch capital and Dutch enterprise will remain of 
primary importance. 
The defraying of the expenses necessary for the rapid develop-
ment of the Indies has only been possible because of the revival of 
the Western estates and concerns there. But only provided their 
products can regularly be disposed of in the foreign markets will 
they be able to hold their own. Those Indies products have often 
proved to be of great value as objects for negotiations when 
negotiations about commercial treaties were being conducted 
between the Mother-Country and other States. Extension of the 
overseas trade—whenever possible—together with further de-
velopment in transport trade, etc., may lead to the creation of 
new outlets, which also in the Motherland may perhaps relieve 
the surplus of population and consequently provide labour for 
many people there. 
It can easily be seen that owing to the unfavourable exchange 
relation between native agricultural products and European and 
American industrial products, many hope for a rapid development 
of native industrialization in Java, and certainly the advantages 
of a greater industrialization of the Netherlands Indies cannot be 
denied. So we can account for the rise of a modest native home 
industry which for some millions provides a small source of 
income, for others a welcome addition to what they earn already 
by agriculture. The development of a native home industry is 
necessary to procure employment in another line for the surplus 
of the decisively agrarian Java population, which in thirty to thirty-
five years will be doubled, whereas there threatens to be a shortage 
of soil within a short time. Before anything, this native industry 
will have to face competition with the cheap articles imported 
from other oriental countries, such as Japan and China. 
For Western manufacturers it will be necessary in the first place 
to produce those articles that are wanted and in demand in the 
East and that are not made there as yet. The capital and skilled 
labour needed for this industry may be Dutch again. A groat 
advantage for our trade and industry in the overseas territories is 
the fact that the whole governing apparatus is in our hands, and 
Western tuition supports Dutch ideas and principles. 
To be sure, this is a grand task for our educated young people 
and young professionals in those far tropical regions in the Govern-
ment, the army, the police, jurisdiction, and education. Thus also 
in the future the Netherlands and their overseas possessions can co-
operate economically and culturally. Assuredly for the Nether-
lands Indies as much as for other countries the future is still very 
unsettled and there are great anxieties and difficulties to be faced, 
but there are also many new prospects for the Netherlands Indies 
as well as for the Motner-Country. 
